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Abstract 
 
This paper tries to disentangle the dynamic relationships between fiscal variables and 
economic activity in a small emerging economy characterized by full dollarization, 
namely, Ecuador. We find that fiscal policy in Ecuador seems to be sustainable, 
explained by its policy of debt payment through oil revenues, rather than by a fiscal 
discipline that dollarization is supposed to encourage. The non-oil tax revenues variable 
is a purely adjusting variable. This result suggests that in a dollarized country that 
cannot benefit from the “seignorage” revenues, the reliance on volatile oil revenues and 
on smoothing tax revenues leaves the economy’s fiscal sustainability vulnerable. 
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1. Introduction 
Ecuador adopted the U.S. dollar as legal tender, replacing its own currency, the Sucre, 
in January 2000.1 The relative advantages and drawbacks of official dollarization to a 
country are well documented.2 To sum up, dollarization may lower the country’s cost of 
foreign credit, may enhance the credibility of government fiscal policy and facilitate the 
control of inflation and interest rates. However, by adopting dollarization a developing 
country would accept at least three costly consequences: Its government would give up 
the revenue it enjoys from creating money (“seignorage” revenues) and its central bank 
would no longer serve as a lender of last resort to domestic banks or to control domestic 
monetary policy.  
One of the arguments used by Ecuadorian’s authorities to justify the decision to 
dollarize the economy was precisely that it may enhance fiscal discipline3 since this is 
one of the main benefits attributed by the literature to fixed exchange rate regimes4, 
which not only include a peg to a (hard) foreign currency -which may or may not be 
permanent-, but also: currency boards, currency unions, and dollarization. However, 
there is no consensus in the literature about this benefit.  While some of authors (see, for 
                                                 
1 In the early 1990s, Ecuador introduced various structural reforms that provided a certain degree of macroeconomic 
stability at least until the middle of that decade. However, a number of endogenous shocks – including, an inefficient 
fiscal policy and increasing financial dollarization – and exogenous shocks – including the impact of the climate 
oscillation, el Niño, and international oil prices – immersed the country in a period of economic stagnation that saw 
macroeconomic imbalances increase (Jacome, 2004). At the end of the twentieth century, Ecuador experienced one of 
the most serious crises in the history of the Republic with inflation rates being recorded at 30 percent per month. The 
government intervened in the banks and many public deposits were frozen. Internationally, Ecuador’s standing was 
not good; it was in arrears with its private creditors and bondholders, while the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank withheld important loans that might have supported the 
Ecuadorian balance of payments. The country was in urgent need of radical measures that would stabilize 
expectations, avoid acute currency depreciation and hyperinflation, and restore economic and financial activity. At 
the same time, the government was in urgent need of radical measures that would allow it to escape being 
overthrown. At its head, President Mahuad faced the challenges of severe social and economic crisis - real GDP fell 
7.3 percent, unemployment rose from 11 to 15 percent and an active indigenous movement called for political and 
economic reform. In an attempt to switch the focus from political issues to economic matters, he concluded that the 
radical solution was dollarization.   
2 See Alesina and Barro (2001), Berg and Borensztein (2000) and De Nicoló et al. (2005), and among other authors. 
3 See http://www.bce.fin.ec/documentos/PublicacionesNotas/Notas/Dolarizacion/dolarizar.html 
4 There is a very abundant literature examining the advantages and disadvantages of each exchange rate regime and 
its optimal choice [see, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), or Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004), to name a few].  
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example, Chang, 2000) point out that if a government is prone to lax fiscal behavior, 
dollarization may impose some discipline by making it more difficult for the 
government to finance excess fiscal behavior, as it would eliminate seigniorage 
revenues and inflationary finance and force the government to issue only foreign 
currency debt. Others, Tornell and Velasco (1998, 2000) among them, argue that 
dollarization differs from flexible exchange rates not in preventing lax fiscal behavior 
but in shifting its costs to the future. A government can always finance its expenditures 
today by borrowing. The cost of such a move would be a higher interest rate if exchange 
rates were flexible. Under dollarization, the interest cost may be lower but the fiscal 
expenditures have to be paid in some other way; in most cases, doing so means 
lowering expenditures, or looking for alternative resources: either increasing loans or 
raising taxes tomorrow.5 However, since, on the one hand, tax increases entail an 
immediate political cost, and, on the other, indebtedness is limited by both the 
intertemporal budget constraint and by external constraints imposed by financial 
institutions, the bottom line would be that by giving up control of its money supply, a 
full dollarization regime encourages fiscal discipline (enhancing policy credibility) but 
also constrains the country’s fiscal room of maneuver’s response in order to stabilize the 
economy in difficult times. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine if dollarization has enhanced fiscal 
sustainability in a small open (emerging) economy characterized not only by full 
dollarization, but also by its substantial reliance on oil exports, namely, Ecuador.  So, 
the interdependence and feedback between economic and fiscal variables will be 
analyzed in order to detect whether these variables present a different behavior than the 
one they had before dollarization.  
                                                 
5 In addition, some empirical studies do not find evidence of fiscal discipline in countries with fixed exchange rate 
regimes [see Goldfajn and Olivares (2000) or Duttagupta and Tolosa (2006)], either. 
 4 
First, as Figure A in the Appendix I shows, Ecuadorian total debt-to-GDP ratio has 
fallen since 20006. However, this trend has not been a consequence of a healthy and 
balanced fiscal system. Conversely, it must be understood in the light of the active 
management policy of its public debt in Ecuador which led to certain significant events 
in the country: (1) the default on its Brady bonds in the summer of 1999, (2) the debt 
reduction fiscal policy involving debt-buyback operations, and (3) the default on its 
external debt on December 2008.7 Second, Correa’s government has been implementing 
a new expansive fiscal policy pattern (including programs addressed to reduce poverty 
or to rise education level) that has lead to fiscal deficits as can be observed in Figure B 
in the same Appendix I which shows that since 2007 the gap between government 
spending and tax revenues has increased.8 Summing up, the active management policy 
of its public debt implemented by Ecuadorian government by earmarking oil revenues 
to debt buybacks and by debt restructuring during the period 2000-2005 clearly explains 
the downtrend presented by the debt-to-GDP ratio from 2000. Indeed, from 2002 there 
was a macro-fiscal rule in Ecuador that limits its debt-to-GDP ratio to 40% which has 
resulted in a debt ratio of only 19% in 2011 (see Ecuador Central Bank, 2013). 
However, since fiscal policy not only did not change (either by cutting government 
                                                 
6 This is a very odd result in Latin American countries, that might be understood in the context of a very active 
management of their public debt by Ecuadorian authorities, since the literature on emerging economies has provided 
evidence of a lack of responsible credit policies of both governments and financial institutions in these countries, 
which has fostered important debt crisis in those countries (see Aggarwal (1996), Edwards (1988, 2008) and FDCI 
(1997) and among others).  
7 At the peak of a devastating economic crisis, Ecuador was forced to default on its Brady bonds ($6.6 bn of the total 
debt) in the summer of 1999. The restructuring process, officially implemented in August 2000, resulted in a 
reduction of close to 40 per cent in the face value of the tendered bonds. After this, Ecuador focused its fiscal policy 
on debt reduction. The 2002 Fiscal Responsibility, Stabilization and Transparency Act, created the Stabilization Fund 
for Social and Productive Investment and Debt Reduction (FEIREP), a special trust fund managed by the Central 
Bank. The FEIREP funds earmarked 70 per cent for debt-buyback operations; 20 per cent to stabilize oil revenues 
and for emergency spending, and 10 per cent for education and health spending. The Fund was replaced in 2005 by 
the Special Account for the Productive and Social Reactivation, Development of Science and Technology and the 
Fiscal Stabilization (CEREPS). The 70 per cent earmarking to debt reduction was reduced to 35 per cent. The debt-
to-GDP ratio fell from 86 per cent by end-2000 to about 34 per cent by end-2006. However, the government’s 
targeted debt reduction policy caused the revalorization of its international bonds, making the debt buyback even 
more onerous and sparking President Correa’s debt repudiation rhetoric. In December 2008 the debt-to-GDP ratio fell 
to around 23 per cent. The public external debt was at its lowest level for over three decades. Nevertheless, Ecuador 
decided to default again, emphasizing that it was “unwilling” rather than “unable” to pay”.  
8 Ray and Kozameh (2012) and The World Bank (2004) offer more details about these fiscal expansive programs.  
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expenses or by making an important effort to achieve a significant rise in taxes other 
than oil revenues), but Correa’s government promoted a clearly expansive fiscal policy; 
the increase of Ecuadorian fiscal deficit since 2007, jointly with the reversal in the 
decreasing trend presented by the debt ratio from 20129 and the fact that Ecuador, still 
relies on uncertain (they might vanish at some point in the future) and volatile oil 
revenues leave Ecuador vulnerable to future fiscal imbalances. 
To our knowledge, no empirical study has yet explored the dynamic relationships 
between fiscal and macroeconomic variables in Ecuador in order to assess the effects of 
dollarization on its fiscal sustainability. This paper attempts to fill this gap and to 
contribute to this empirical literature by means of the application of a cointegrated VAR 
(CVAR) approach. So, with this goal in mind, the main objectives of this paper are, 
first, to determine the inter-linkages and feedback relationships that exist between fiscal 
and macroeconomic variables in Ecuador; second, to identify the main pushing and 
adjusting forces interacting in the long run equilibrium, i.e., permanent and transitory 
shocks; and third, to discuss the impulse responses of the variables included in the study 
to the already identified shocks.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature 
review. Section 3 describes the theoretical approach. Section 4 presents the econometric 
methodology and the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 explains the results. 
Finally, section 6 summarizes the main concluding remarks.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Currently, in the aftermath of the world financial and economic crisis that followed Lehman Brothers collapse in 
2008, Ecuador has already reversed (from 2012) the abovementioned downward trend. 
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2. Literature review 
As far as we know, few studies have examined the effects of dollarization on fiscal 
policy.10 Concretely, in the case of Ecuador, only a handful of authors have examined 
its fiscal policy during the dollarization period. Cueva (2008) and Almeida et al. (2006) 
report that the legal framework for the distribution and earmarking of oil and tax 
revenues is cumbersome and creates large rigidities in fiscal management; Barnhill and 
Kopits (2003), in developing a Value-At-Risk approach, find that the volatility of 
sovereign spreads and of oil prices constitutes a major source of risk for Ecuador’s 
public sector; Alvarado et al. (2004), calculate debt threshold sensitivities for different 
assumptions regarding revenue volatility and expenditure adjustments; Mejía et al. 
(2006) claim that dollarization has limited the range of fiscal instruments available to 
governments and warn of the dangers of dependency on oil revenues, which they define 
as a source of instability in a balanced budget; finally, The World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank (2004) expose that, although Ecuador’s fiscal stance has 
improved substantially when compared to the sudden stop crisis it experienced in 1998-
99, the country is still quite vulnerable to external shocks due to the volatility of 
government’s revenues and high inflexibility of government non-interest expenditure.11  
However, as stated before, as far as we know, no empirical study has yet explored the 
dynamic relationships between fiscal and macroeconomic variables in Ecuador in order 
to assess the effects of dollarization on its fiscal sustainability by means of a CVAR 
approach, which is best-suited for testing our hypothesis12 and may shed some light on 
                                                 
10 Literature is not so scarce on the effects of fiscal policy in other forms of extreme rate regimes such as a Currency 
Boards, though. See, for instance, Grandes and Reisen (2003) in the case of Argentina, and Vladimirov and Neycheva 
(2009) in the case of Bulgaria. 
11 The World Bank (2004) also emphasize that dollarization has left fiscal policy as the unique device to counteract 
shocks, and propose a reduction in expenditure entitlements and the consolidation of a reliable oil stabilization fund 
in order to achieve more flexibility in fiscal policy. 
12 The advantages of this methodology over others to analyse the inter-linkages and feedback effects among variables 
are clearly presented in Hoover et al. (2007) and Juselius (2009). 
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how best to harmonize fiscal policies in countries with extreme exchange rate regimes 
such as monetary unions or dollarized countries (recall that a dollarization can be 
defined as a unilateral monetary union). Indeed, this methodology has been broadly 
used by other authors to analyze these dynamic relationships in other economies, but 
mainly developed ones.  
In this sense, Favero et al. (2011) highlight the importance of including feedback 
between fiscal and macroeconomic variables in VAR models, since it conditions the 
reactions of both variables to fiscal shocks. Bohn (1998) proposes error-correction-type 
policy reactions as a promising alternative for understanding debt and deficit problems 
in the United States. Other empirical studies include Bohn (2007) for the US; Collignon 
(2012) for Europe; and Fincke and Greiner (2012) for selected countries in the euro 
area. The analysis of fiscal sustainability in developing countries by means of a VAR 
approach is much scarcer though. Some exceptions are Kia (2008) and El Anshasy and 
Bradley (2012) who undertake the analysis for oil-exporting countries and emphasize 
the procyclicality of fiscal policy in these countries;13 and Martins (2010), who develops 
a CVAR to assess the dynamic relationships between foreign aid inflows, public 
expenditure, revenues and debt in Ethiopia.14  
3. Theoretical approach. 
A fiscal shock (a shift in taxes or in government spending) at some point in time puts a 
constraint on the path of taxes and spending in the future, since the government 
intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) will eventually have to be met. This is the reason 
why some studies of the effects of fiscal policy based on VAR models have been 
                                                 
13 El Anshasy and Bradley (2012) find that, in the long run, the higher the oil prices, the larger government spending, 
while in the short run government expenditure rises less than proportionately to the increase of oil revenues. 
14Actually, an analogy between oil revenues and aid inflows can be made, since both variables are affected by 
external shocks; the former depends on price volatility, and the latter on donors’ goodwill.  
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extended to satisfy the IBC [see Konstantinou (2004), Bohn (2005) or Favero and 
Giavazzi (2007), to name a few] and why the CVAR approach developed in this paper 
will also be inspired by the theoretical predictions of the IBC theory.  
3.1. The Model  
In this section, we set out a simple budget relationship along with the restrictions that 
must be satisfied for sustainability. Consider that an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio 
depends on the economic environment (rt - gt)dt-1, and on the primary surplus. If the 
interest rate (rt) exceeds the growth rate (gt), then the debt-to-GDP ratio (dt) will 
increase indefinitely unless there is a primary surplus which can offset the rising debt 
service. The paths of public debt implied by the sequences of primary surplus (st) and 
economic environment (rt - gt) are: 
1
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Assuming the economic environment as given and constant, the accumulation of debt 
over several periods t=1…n, will be: 
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Assuming that the transversality condition holds,15 fiscal policy will satisfy the 
intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) because it is on a path in which the present value 
of expected future primary surpluses equals the initial debt: 
                                                                                                  (4) 
 
Equation (4) states that debt sustainability requires a variation in the primary budget 
surplus. A surplus is needed when the growth rate falls below the rate of return on 
government bonds. Thus, whether fiscal policy is sustainable or not depends on the sign 
of the fiscal policy reaction with respect to the target: i.e., if an increase in debt is 
followed by an increase in primary surpluses, debt is sustainable. In the long run, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is required to converge on an equilibrium position that is determined 
by the nominal growth rate, target reference values, and adjustment coefficients.16 
In order to explain the sustainability of oil-producing countries, Kia (2008) extends 
Barro’s (1979, 1986) tax smoothing model by introducing energy revenues. In Barro’s 
approach, the base of real taxable income is a deterministic variable (yt), a fixed fraction 
of real GDP that generally depends on the path of tax rates. Kia (2008) assumes GDP to 
be a function of the country’s energy income.  
Let τ be the average tax rate and τyt the real tax revenues. The total government 
revenues of an oil-producing country are, therefore, the sum of τyt and ENt, the oil 
revenues derived from the exports of the natural resource. The government budget 
                                                 
15 The initial debt equals the expected present value of future primary surpluses, if and only if discounted future debt 
converges to zero (Bohn, 2005).  
16 Collignon (2012) adopting the fiscal reaction function for European countries 
1 2
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constraint, Equation (4), with constant real interest rate, r, and in a situation in which 
the country has energy income will then be: 
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where the primary surplus 
t js   from Equation (4) now includes energy revenues ENt.17 
If both primary balance and debt are non-stationary, according to equation (5) the two 
variables should cointegrate and debt would be sustainable.18  
In line with Kia (2008), we have to make several assumptions for our empirical 
purposes, which are to set long run relations between the variables. First, we assume 
that both the real government expenditure, Govt, and the real tax base, yt, are expected to 
fluctuate around the current rate of the growth of the economy g19. Second, the expected 
present value of energy income is also its current value. This means that all economic 
agents expect energy revenues not to change over the remaining life of the oil 
reserves.20 Third, the oil reserves are expected to last forever21 which implies a long run 
relationship between oil revenues and fiscal variables,22or the Ecuadorian government 
                                                 
17 Alvarado (2004) points out that increasing resource exploitation to pay the debt does not affect sustainability since 
it is assumed that oil reserves have the same return as the government’s other financial assets and liabilities.  
18 This concept of debt sustainability is presented by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Trehan and Walsh (1991). 
However, Bohn (1998) shows the existence of cointegration between debt, primary balance and other variables non 
debt determinants of the primary surplus, such as the level of temporary government spending (GVAR) and a 
business cycle indicator (YVAR).  
19 Aggregate real income (Y) grows at the constant rate ρ and government expenditure (G) at the constant rate ϒ. 
Clearly, ρ = ϒ is the only specification within the constant growth rate setup that allows for a positive and finite 
steady state value of G/Y, (see Barro, 1979). 
20This means that all economic agents expect energy revenues not to change over the remaining life of the oil 
reserves:, 

0
m
rt
tt tEN EN e dtE I

 
where t=m when the country’s energy resources are exhausted, and 
tI the 
information available at time t, including the state of the economy (see Kia, 2008).  
21 This assumption, however, is unsustainable based on OPEP’s Annual Statistical Bulletin which states that Ecuador 
has about 8.24 bn barrels of proven reserves and an exportable trend of 334 thousand barrels per day in 2011, that is, 
seventy per cent of its production.  
22In growth models with optimizing households, others authors (see Ramsey (1928) among them) use a similar kind 
of assumption when considering that the representative, infinite-lived household seeks to maximize their overall 
utility. 
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should have to diversify tax revenues and/or cut government expenditure when oil 
resources were exhausted (see Kia, 2008).  
 4.   Econometric Methodology and Data 
4.1. Econometric Methodology  
The study of the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables is usually carried 
out by estimating a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the form: 
1
k
t t i ti
i
X X e

                                                                                                       (6) 
Where 
tX   includes the minimum set of variables required for the VAR analysis, i.e., 
government spending net of interest, net tax revenues, output, inflation and interest rate 
(see Perotti, 2002). In our analysis, this set of variables will be extended in order to 
include the debt level since the importance of monitoring debt dynamics when 
analysing fiscal policy has been stressed by many authors [see (1998), Favero and 
Giavazzi (2007) and Romer and Romer (2010) among them].23  
Following Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992) extend the 
VAR model by applying the concepts of cointegration and error correction to analyse 
long run relations among non-stationary variables. This extension is referred to as the 
Cointegrated VAR (CVAR) with the following representation: 
'
1 1 1t t t tx x x e                                                                                                   (7) 
 
                                                 
23 Bohn (1998) shows that the feedback obtained from the debt to tax and government spending ratios is statistically 
significant and economically relevant; Romer and Romer (2010) claim that the effect of a US tax shock on output 
depends on whether the change in taxes is motivated by the government’s desire to stabilize the debt or not; and 
Favero and Gavazzi (2007) also find that interest rates depend on future monetary policy and the risk premium, both 
variables being affected by the debt dynamics. Hence, the absence of an effect of fiscal shocks on the long-term 
interest rates, a frequent outcome in VAR-based research that omits debt level, may be due to a misspecification.  
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The moving average representation of the CVAR is given by: 
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                      or      
* 'C                                              (9) 
Thus, in the autoregressive representation   determines the common long run relations 
(r) and the   their loadings, whereas in the moving average representation 
' determines the common stochastic trends (p-r) or pushing forces of the system, and 
*  their loadings. A zero row in   corresponds to a unit vector in 
' . 
By premultiplying (7) with a non-singular p x p matrix B we obtain the CVAR model 
with simultaneous effects: 
'
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 where     t tu Be                                                                                                          (11) 
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where C~ = 1CB . 
Making a distinction between r transitory and p-r permanent shocks it is assumed that 
all structural shocks are linearly independent,  't t pE u u I , where  ,t s lu u u , 
comprises the shocks with short and long run effects respectively. Defining these shocks 
by (11) its added p x p additional parameters to the unrestricted CVAR so we need to 
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impose the same number of restrictions on the parameters of the model to achieve just 
identification.  
The methodology is extensively described in Juselius (2006). She shows how the VAR 
model, allowing for unit roots and, hence, cointegration, specifies economically 
meaningful short and long-run structures, such as steady-state relationships and 
common trends, interactions, and feedback effects. In our empirical analysis, equation 
(5) could be rewritten as: 
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                                                                                 (13) 
where the deviation from the steady-state value, νt, measures the extent of excess 
expected surplus (positive or negative) in the economy at time t relative to its long run 
value. We need νt to be a stationary process, implying that the economic forces should 
be activated when νt ≠ 0, pulling the process back towards its long run benchmark value. 
This approach capture the rich dynamics of fiscal aggregates through the identification 
of two sorts of fiscal policy shocks; on the one hand, shocks allowing variables to adjust 
to the long run relationship; on the other, shocks which are pushing the process away 
from equilibrium.24 
4.2. Data 
We use monthly data obtained from the Central Bank of Ecuador covering the period 
2001:01 to 2013:03.25 The fiscal variables are the log of government spending net of 
                                                 
24Perotti (2002) describes the four approaches to identify fiscal shocks that have been used in the literature: (1) The 
“narrative approach”; (2) the Cholesky ordering; (3) the sign restrictions on the impulse responses rather than the 
linear restrictions on the contemporaneous relations between reduced form innovations and structural shocks, and 
finally (4) the structural VARs.   
25We exclude data corresponding to the first year after dollarization since the different economic variables were still 
adjusting to the new exchange rate regime. Detailed charts regarding the evolution of the variables for the pre-
dollarization versus the post-dollarization period can be found in "Estadísticas Macroeconómicas. Presentación 
estructural". Ecuador Central Bank (2013).   
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interests, LGOVt, and also including interests, LTGOVt; the log of non-oil tax revenues, 
LREVt, and the log of oil revenues, LOREVt.
26 The remaining variables are the log of 
Economic Activity Index (EAI) represented by LEAIt; the log of the total (external and 
internal) debt-to-GDP ratio, LDEBT_GDPt, and the inflation rate, LINFt. These 
variables are not seasonally adjusted, since such an adjustment could modify the 
relations between the variables.27 
The EAIt
28 variable was chosen as a proxy of the economic activity evolution instead of 
the GDP because Ecuador was dollarized in 2000:1 and the GDP is only reported 
annually or quarterly, whilst the EAIt variable is generated on a monthly frequency. 
Therefore, given that the correlation between the two variables is very high, in order to 
have availability of the highest number of observations from the dollarized period we 
made the decision to use the EAIt variable. In order to have a complete characterization 
of the dynamic relationships we want to examine, a proxy for the price pressures should 
be included. We decided to include the inflation rate in the model, although since 2000 
an important inflation reduction took place in Ecuador, not only two digit inflation rates 
(that were usual from 1990 to 2001) disappeared, but also during the period 2004-2012 
it remained very stable around the 4% level, with the only exception of 2008-2009 
following the increase in oil prices29 (see Figure C in the Appendix I).30  
                                                 
26 The oil sector accounts for about 50 per cent of Ecuador’s export earnings and about one-third of all tax revenues 
(US Energy Information Administration Report 2012). Besides, the inclusion of the oil revenues as an endogenous 
variable prevents using other variables such as international oil prices, since its high correlation would have entailed 
multicolinearity problems. 
27 See Lütkepohl (2004).  
28 The Economic Activity Index, which is calculated on a monthly frequency, involves production variables that show 
the trend of the economic activity. It is calculated as a quantum production indicator and has the mathematic form of 
Laspeyres index. It takes into account industries that cover more than 60 percent of GDP such as banana, coffee, 
cacao, fishing, oil refiner, manufacture, electricity, construction, transport or financial services. See: 
http://www.bce.fin.ec/index.php/component/k2/item/313-indice-de-actividad-econ%C3%B3mica-coyuntural-ideac 
for more details on its calculation.  
29 Marí del Cristo and Gómez-Puig (2013) by means of a VECM analysis suggest that rising rates of imports from 
trade partners other than the United States and subsequent real effective exchange rate depreciations are causing the 
pass-through to move away from zero in Ecuador since it is importing inflation from its main trading partners (most 
of them emerging countries with appreciated currencies). 
30 The CVAR framework does not require all series to be I(1). All that is required is that they are at most I(1). An I(0) 
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The rest of variables included in our analysis are plotted in Figure D in the Appendix I; 
whilst Table A in the same Appendix presents a brief description of the six endogenous 
variables we finally used in the CVAR model. Hence, the vector of endogenous 
variables comprised in the CVAR model is the following:  
Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt, LDEBT_GDPt]
31  
5. Empirical Results 
To analyze whether the long run relation described in equation (7) exists (i.e. whether 
the fiscal policy of Ecuador is on a sustainable path), and to establish which different 
shocks may have permanent and transitory effects on the variables, we shall focus on 
the success of a well-specified empirical model. Once the assumptions upon which our 
statistical model is based are satisfied, we impose restrictions in order to discover 
interactions of the variables. This method, described as general-to-specific, is best 
explained in Hendry (1995). 
Since statistical inference from the VAR model is only valid provided the parameters 
are constant and the residuals do not present autocorrelation or skewness,32 we choose 
four lags (k=2) to solve the problem of autocorrelated residuals and include three 
dummies to eliminate the problem of skewness due to data outliers.33 The first outlier is 
                                                                                                                                               
variable in a CVAR model means a cointegrating vector on its own. Using the trace test, we reject non-stationarity for 
Ecuadorian inflation (which is expected due to the fact that its value is close to zero throughout all the sample 
period), but we do not reject it for the rest of variables included in our models. 
31 These variables are not cyclically adjusted since fiscal variables have been collected on a monthly frequency basis, 
while GDP is only quarterly or annually reported by the Central Bank of Ecuador. If the intention was to isolate the 
cyclical effect from fiscal variables, we would had to create monthly GDP by interpolation techniques, with the risk 
of underestimating or overestimating the business cycle effect. Neither creating quarterly or annually fiscal variables 
to adjust them is a suitable option because, first, we need the maximum of observations to ensure enough degrees of 
freedom to carry on diverse hypothesis on the CVAR, and second, we would lose valuable information intrinsic in 
monthly frequency.  
32 Simulation studies have shown that valid statistical inference is sensitive to the violation of some of the 
assumptions, including parameter non-constancy, autocorrelated residuals and skewed residuals, while quite robust to 
others, such as excess kurtosis and residual heteroscedasticity [see Rahbek et al. (2003) and Cheung and Lai (1993)] 
33We use the likelihood ratio test procedure 
 
^ ^
112ln / ln lnk kk kQ H H T 
 
      
 
where 
kH  is the null hypothesis that 
the model needs k lags and 
1kH  is the alternative hypothesis that the VAR needs k+1 lags. This test is distributed as 
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associated with the moment when Ecuador restructured its external debt in June 2009.34 
The second outlier corresponds to an increase in the active interest rate in October 2001 
despite dollarization 35 and influenced Ecuadorian budget revenues in February 2008. 
Therefore, we introduce two permanent dummies, dum0906t and dum0802t whose value 
is 1 if t refers to that date and zero otherwise. We also include a transitory dummy 
(dum0609t) which has the value 1 if t=2006:09, -1 if t=2006:10, and zero otherwise, in 
order to eliminate the third outlier corresponding to the LOREVt residuals.
36 All our 
statistical tests are now acceptable. The univariate normality tests only reject normality 
on the residuals of LDEBT_GDPt and LINFt because of the presence of some kurtosis, 
but they show little skewness.37 Thus, our model should be well-specified and the 
empirical results might be reliable.  
Therefore, we calculate the trace test statistics (Johansen, 1996), one including both 
seasonal and permanent dummies, and a second without dummies as a sensitivity 
analysis.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 in Appendix II shows that both tests determine the existence of two 
cointegrating relations. Thus, the IBC is fulfilled in Ecuador, since the variables 
involved in equation (7) cointegrate, which was expected, as Figure A depicts a 
                                                                                                                                               
χ2 with p2 degrees of freedom. However, we also observe the Akaike, the Schwartz and the Hannan-Quinn 
information criteria to finally decide the optimal number of lags, as well as the Lagrange Multiplier test to check for 
left-over residual autocorrelation in each VAR(k).  
34 The total external debt ratio was reduced from 106 per cent GDP at the end of 1999 to around 98 per cent in 2000 
(see Quispe-Agnoli, 2006). In June 2009 the Correa government defaulted on $3.2 billion of foreign public debt, and 
then completed a buyback of 91 per cent of the defaulted bonds (see Sandoval and Weisbrot, 2009). 
35After dollarization, in spite of the elimination of money creation, during 2000 and 2001 both inflation and active 
interest rates still remained above international levels (see Larrea, 2004), just after these years Ecuador experienced a 
reduction in interest rates as Figure D in the Apendix I shows. 
36 Two contributing factors to the positive fiscal performance occurred in 2006. First, in April 2006 Congress 
approved a reform to the Hydrocarbons Act stipulating that when crude prices exceed the level agreed in the contract 
with each private company, the State will be entitled to 50% of the revenues from those oil exports. Second, in May 
2006 the Minister for Energy and mines announced the termination of the contract between State and Occidental 
Petroleum with important oilfields (Block 15 of the Amazon region and the unified fields of Eden Yuturi and 
Limoncocha) now being managed by the state-owned enterprise PETROECUADOR (see ECLAC, 2006).  
37 Our non-normal residuals (from AIRt, LDEBT_GDPt) present positive and negative skewness less than 0.14, which 
is inside the range suggesting a normal population (see Doane and Seward, 2011).  
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downward trend for the debt-to-GDP ratio. Once the CVAR model is restricted to 
rank=2 and has passed a number of diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, we begin 
to impose restrictions on β and α. These are tested with a likelihood ratio test procedure 
described in Johansen (1996), Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Juselius (2006).  
We test three types of restrictions on β vectors: long-run exclusion of a specific 
variable, stationarity of individual variables, and stationarity of linear combinations of 
variables. These tests allow the identification of the long-run structure of the r 
stationarity cointegrating relations.38 As Table 2 in Appendix II illustrates, one variable 
can be excluded from long run relations, namely the total debt LDEBT_GDPt.
39  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The exclusion of the debt variable from the model might be related to the fact that, as it 
has been mentioned; Ecuadorian authorities have been managing quite actively its stock 
of public debt, by earmarking oil revenues to debt buybacks and by debt restructuring.  
So, our new model is: 
 Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, EAIt, LINFt].
40   
We repeat all the tests described above for this new model and their results are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix II. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
Following Martins (2010), several hypotheses can be tested on the cointegrating 
vectors. Table 5 in Appendix II shows some of them. On the one hand, whether Ecuador 
                                                 
38 In order to identify the long run structure we need to impose at least r(r-1) restrictions on   vectors.  
39 This is to be expected since the total debt-to-GDP ratio is unrelated to the path of its fiscal surpluses but to the 
1999’s default. 
40 The model’s specification has changed to require only three lags and the transitory dummy dum0609t. The 
inclusion of interests in government expenditure (LTGOVt) does not change the main results.  
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depends on oil revenues to ensure a balanced budget or whether tax revenues are not 
sufficient to achieve a balanced budget can be tested by hypotheses H1 and H2, 
respectively. On the other, the “Additionality” hypothesis (H3) which implies that oil 
revenues produce equivalent government expenditure can also be tested. The coefficient 
corresponding to oil revenues can offer relevant information: (i) if is higher than 1 it 
may suggest that public expenditure increase more than the amount of the net oil 
revenues; (ii) if is close to one it implies oil revenues generate an equivalent increase in 
government expenditure; (iii) if is lower than 1 it is a sign of fungibility, this term 
describes situations where earmarked oil revenues are indirectly used for unintended 
purposes. Finally, “Tax Displacement” hypothesis (H4) relates higher oil revenues to the 
government’s disincentive to increase taxes, corresponding with a coefficient of oil 
revenues lower than 141. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results displayed in Table 5 in Appendix II suggests that oil revenues are financing 
fiscal deficit (H1), and that there exists a positive relationship between oil revenues and 
government expenditure (H3) and a negative relationship between oil and tax revenues 
(H4). Table 7 in Appendix II illustrates the final estimations which state the 
“Additionality” of oil revenues to government expenditure and tax displacement.  
In order to assess the long run behavior of the variables we test a zero row and a unit 
vector in α. Concretely, testing a zero row in α is equivalent to examine whether a 
variable is weak exogenous for the long run relationship which defines common driving 
trends (the pulling and pushing forces) in the system, since these variables do not adjust 
to the long run relationships. They (through their own shocks) can affect, but not be 
affected by, the rest of variables. In contrast, testing a unit vector in α reveals which 
                                                 
41 These two hypotheses have been used in a previous study in Martins (2010) 
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variable is purely adjusting to the long run relationships, i.e., its own shocks have only 
transitory effects on the remaining variables in the system. The results from this 
analysis are presented in Table 6 in Appendix II. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
From Table 6 we can conclude that only two variables are purely adjusting: LREVt and 
LOREVT variables; while LGOVt , EAIt and LINFt variables seem to be the pushing 
forces of the system. 
Moreover, when identifying our '
i
 matrix, using the structure that imposes H3 
(since it gave the highest p-value in the analysis shown in Table 5), beta vectors 
describe two long run relationships which are presented in Table 742. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The first suggests a linkage between oil revenues and government expenditure variables, 
while the second reveals the relationship that exists between traditional deficit 
(government spending minus tax revenues) and economic activity. The structure 
illustrated in Table 7 complements the results presented in Table 6 because it shows to 
which long run relationship the two variables LREVt and LOREVt are purely adjusting. 
Tax revenues are adjusting to the second long run relationship; and oil revenues adjust 
to government demands. Note the borderline significance (based on the Student’s t 
statistic) of the adjustment coefficient corresponding to LGOVt; this is because this 
variable generates both transitory and permanent shocks. We will see this afterwards 
when we analyze the structural moving average representation of the cointegrated VAR.  
                                                 
42 We also include the estimations of imposing H1 and H4 in Table 7. Both hypotheses have been used in Section 5.1. 
to examine the robustness of results.  
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The impulse response functions are calculated with the following structurally identified 
MA model: 43 
1,
2,
1,
2,
3,
00*** *0***
00*** *****
00*00 *****
00**0 *****
00*** *****
t
s i
i t
t
s it
i t
t t
t l i
i t
t
t
t l i
i t
t
l i
i t
u
uLREV
LOREV
LGOV u
LEAI
LINF u
u





 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
    
    
       
 
 
 
 
 
 





1, 1, 1
2, 2, 1
1
1, 1 1, 1
2, 2, 1
3, 3, 1
s t s t
s t s t
l t l t
l t l t
l t l t
u u
u u
u C B u
u u
u u






      
   
         
    
          
 
The exclusion restrictions on the permanent shocks are defined by assuming: firstly, 
government spending inertia, and secondly, that a nominal shock cannot have a long run 
effect on real income. The other exclusion restriction on the transitory shocks is defined 
by assuming “sticky” taxes, so tax revenues do not react immediately to the second 
transitory shock. Therefore, we estimate the B matrix normalized at the largest 
coefficient in each row. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results, presented in Table 8, define how the orthogonalized permanent and 
transitory shocks are associated with the estimated CVAR residuals. Recovering the last 
                                                 
43 Since we have five variables, the B matrix adds 25 new coefficients. The assumption that u~IN (0,I) implies 
((p*(p+1)/2) = 15) fithteen restrictions on B (five unit coefficients on the diagonal elements and ten zero restrictions 
on the off-diagonal elements). Six additional restrictions ((p-r)*r =6) are necessary to separate transitory from 
permanent shocks, and four more restrictions are required to achieve a just-identified structural MA model. These 
four extra restrictions are essential because there are two possible sequences of the transitory shocks and two possible 
sequences of the permanent shocks. A single specification can be obtained by imposing three exclusion restrictions on 
the common trends and one exclusion restriction on the transitory impulse responses. 
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two rows and substituting in the equation: ut = Bet, we obtain the combinations which 
make up the permanent shocks:44 
ul,1 = B’l,1et = 0.422elrev,t+0.228elorev,t+elgov,t -0.303eleai,t+0.165elinf,t                
ul,2 = B’l,2et = 0.105elrev,t+0.014elorev,t- 0.087elgov,t + eleai,t -0.139elinf,t                
ul,3 = B’l,3et = 0.027elrev,t+0.046elorev,t- 0.458elgov,t + 0.142eleai,t +elinf,t                
It can be observed that the first permanent shock is primarily given by shocks to 
government expenditure, the second one by shocks to economic activity and the third by 
shocks to inflation rate. Our results also suggest that the influence of oil revenue shocks 
may have fallen, an outcome which, given the finite nature of oil reserves, can be 
considered as positive. Finally, Table 9 and Figure 1 in Appendix II describe the 
dynamic impulse response functions after 17 periods for each of the system’s variables 
resulting from a one standard deviation shock. 
[Insert Table 9 and Figure 1 here] 
We are able to verify that all transitory shocks have a zero long-run impact on the five 
variables, whereas all permanent shocks have a non-zero impact, except for oil revenues 
with respect to the second and third shocks and the identifying zero impact on 
government expenditure. Economic activity and inflation rate shocks have transitory 
impacts on oil revenues since this latter variable depends on both oil prices and oil 
national production, along with government demands. It can also be seen that tax 
revenues are affected permanently by the three permanent shocks: economic activity, 
government expenditure and inflation rate.  
                                                 
44 The first two rows give the combinations which make up the transitory shocks. Note that the second transitory 
shock is primarily given by shocks to government expenditure. Hence, government expenditure can be regarded as a 
source of transitory and permanent shock. It adjusts to long run relations as a transitory shock (See Table 7) but also it 
can be considered a pushing force that put the system out of equilibrium generating shocks with long run impact on 
the rest of the variables.  
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5.1. Robustness of results 
In order to gain robustness in our results, we impose other two hypotheses in our 
'
i
 matrix to get identification, and consequently, another set of impulse responses 
functions45.  First, we impose the structure of H1 to identify the long run relations of the 
model. Table 7 shows these estimations; whilst Table 10 in the same Appendix defines 
how the orthogonalized permanent and transitory shocks are associated with the 
estimated CVAR residuals.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Table 11 and Figure 2 in Appendix II describe the dynamic impulse response functions, 
after 15 periods, for each of the system’s variables resulting from a one standard 
deviation shock. Second, we test the hypothesis H4 . See Table 7 to check these latter 
estimations.  Table 12 defines how the orthogonalized permanent and transitory shocks 
are associated with the estimated CVAR residuals.  
[Insert Tables 11 to 12 and Figure 2 here] 
Finally, Table 13 and Figure 3 describe the dynamic impulse response functions after 17 
periods for each of the system’s variables resulting from a one standard deviation 
shocks. As it can be seen, from these latter results, one can draw the same conclusions 
that were drawn with the first identification done on the long run structure.   
[Insert Table 13 and Figure 3 here] 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Recall that the first set of impulse response corresponds to the structure of H3. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
This article seeks to assess the impact of dollarization on Ecuador’s fiscal sustainability 
given that this economy is strongly dependent on oil revenues which are particularly 
volatile because of price fluctuations, but have to finance increasing government 
expenditure in a context where, according to the OPEP, oil reserves will eventually 
vanish.   
We have applied a CVAR approach inspired in the theoretical predictions of the 
intertemporal budget constraint theory. Our results suggest that fiscal policy in Ecuador 
seems to be sustainable, due to its low debt–to-GDP ratio, but there are three variables 
that tend to push the fiscal system out of equilibrium: economic activity, public 
spending and the inflation rate. Moreover, we have also found that (non-oil) tax 
revenues are purely adjusting variables, which means that their shocks do not have a 
permanent impact on the rest of the variables. Even though this result is consistent with 
Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing theory, it may put the fiscal sustainability of a dollarized 
country at risk. Mainly, since oil revenues not only tend to adjust to public expenditures, 
but also to “displace” non-oil revenues.  
In our opinion, this conclusion can be extended to other countries. First, many countries 
might face an important fiscal problem in the future due to aging population and the 
consequent increase in health care spending. Therefore, tax smoothing theory might not 
ensure fiscal sustainability (taxes should have a positive impact on output at long run, 
albeit they have a negative impact at short run). Second, not only a positive response of 
primary surplus to offset the rising debt service is needed to satisfy the intertemporal 
budget constrain, but taxes should have a positive long-term impact on activity.  
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In the specific case of Ecuador, as a dollarized country, it might be difficult to achieve 
the needed primary surpluses since Ecuador not only cannot benefit from the 
“seignorage” revenues, but has also given up the exchange rate instrument which might 
be fundamental to encourage the development of sectors other than the oil one. Indeed, 
its reliance on volatile oil revenues, which eventually might vanish, leaves the 
economy’s fiscal sustainability vulnerable to external and internal shocks. 
Given the important policy implications of the analysis further extensions of the 
presented research are on our agenda.  The inclusion of some other relevant variables in 
the model (such as a measure of the market exchange rate, the monetary and fiscal 
variables on the anchor country), or the extension of the sample period including the 
pre-dollarization period, might be useful to reassess the results.   
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Appendix I 
  Figure A:  Total Debt-to-GDP ratio               Figure B: Primary balance variables 
           
   Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and our own estimates.  
 
 Figure C: Ecuadorian Inflation rate          Figure D: EAI and Active interest rate  
     
     Source: Central Bank of Ecuador  
 
Table A: Description of variables 
Variable  Description  Unit Source 
 
Total Government 
spending (LTGOVt) 
Government purchases of goods and 
services (current consumption, gross 
fixed capital formation, wages) + 
interests.  
Millions of 
U.S. dollars  
Monthly Information 
Bulletin. Central Bank of 
Ecuador (CBE) 
 
Government spending net 
interest (LGOVt)  
Total Government spending – interests 
 
Millions of 
U.S. dollars 
Monthly Information 
Bulletin CBE 
Interests (LINt)  Both external and internal debt interests 
 
Millions of 
U.S. dollars 
Monthly Information 
Bulletin CBE 
 Economic Activity Index 
(IDEAC, the acronym in 
Spanish (LEAIt)) 
 
Describing the variation in volume of 
Ecuadorian economic activity 
Index Monthly Information 
Bulletin CBE 
Total Revenues (LTREVt)  
 
Tax revenues + oil revenues + public 
enterprises surplus 
 
Millions of 
U.S. dollars 
Monthly Information 
Bulletin CBE 
Oil revenues (LOREVt)  
 
Oil revenues from exports and sale of its 
derivatives 
 
Millions of 
U.S. dollars 
Monthly Information 
Bulletin CBE 
Tax Revenues (LREVt) 
 
Revenues from direct and indirect taxes 
 
Millions of 
U.S. dollars 
Monthly Information 
Bulletin CBE 
Inflation (LINFt) Annual inflation. 
 
Percentage Monthly Information 
Bulletin CPI (ECB) 
Active interest rate (AIRt)  Short term interest rate. Credit cost to 
three months. 
Percentage  ECLAC 
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Appendix II  
 
Table 1. Trace test for the first model:  
Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt, LDEBT_GDPt] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Trace test without seasonal or dummies variables. *Bartell correction for small samples.   
 
 
Table  2. Tests of stationarity and long-run exclusion for the first model: 
Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt, LDEBT_GDPt] 
 
Test 5%C.V. LREVt LOREVt LGOVt LEAIt LINFt LDEBT_GDPt 
Stationarity  9.488 30.327 28.936 30.161 30.687 30.371 27.877 
p-value --- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exclusion 5.991 51.091 21.727 38.972 13.319 6.639 0.260 
p-value --- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.036 0.878 
Notes: P-values of 0.05 based on χ2 (r). 
 
 
Table 3. Trace test for the second model:  
Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt] 
 
r p – r Eig. Value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
0 5 0.446 168.47 161.39 69.611 0.000 0.000 
1 4 0.283 78.655 75.700 47.707 0.000 0.000 
2 3 0.105 28.033 26.967 29.804 0.08 0.105 
3 2 0.062 11.095 10.508 15.408 0.209 0.248 
4 1 0.009 1.422 1.243 3.841 0.233 0.265 
Notes: Trace test without seasonal or dummies variables. *Bartell correction for small samples.   
 
 
Table 4. Tests of long-run exclusion for the second model: 
Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt] 
 
Test 5%C.V. LREVt LOREVt LGOVt LEAIt LINFt 
Exclusion 5.991 54.630 22.244 41.939 15.203 5.967 
p-value --- 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.051 
Notes: P-values of 0.05 based on χ2 (r). 
 
 
 
 
r p – r Eig.Value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
 
0 6 0.457 192.799 183.030 95.514 0.000 0.000 
1 5 0.300 99.941 95.351 69.611 0.000 0.000 
2 4 0.137 45.755 43.652 47.707 0.076 0.117 
3 3 0.077 23.315 22.173 29.804 0.239 0.298 
4 2 0.048 11.100 10.035 15.408 0.209 0.283 
5 1 0.024 3.640 3.102 3.841 0.056 0.078 
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Table 5. Tests of hypothesis on β for the second model: 
Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt] 
 
Hypothesis* Test of stationarity of linear 
combinations 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
Statistic p-value 
H1: Balanced  budget LGOVt - c*LREVt - (1-c)*LOREVt 2 (1) 1.301 0.254 
H2: Balanced budget 
without oil revenues 
 
LGOVt - c*LREVt 
 
2 (2) 
 
23.707 
 
0.000 
H3: Additionality LGOVt - LOREVt 2 (3) 3.023 0.388 
H4:Tax displacement LREVt - c*LOREVt 2 (2) 5.799 0.055 
Notes: *Hypothesis on one specific vector without imposing restrictions on the other. 
 
Table 6. Tests of hypothesis on α for the second model 
Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt] 
 
Test 5%C.V. LREVt LOREVt LGOVt LEAIt LINFt 
Exogeneity 5.991 40.680 18.726 12.310 3.016 3.853 
p-value --- 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.221 0.146 
Unit Vector 7.815 7.337 9.067 23.875 24.170 26.226 
p-value --- 0.062 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: P-values of 0.05 based on χ2 (r). 
 
 
Table 7. Identifying restriction imposed on the 2nd beta vector and specific 
hypothesis imposed on the first one. Xt = [LREVt, LOREVt, LGOVt, LEAIt, LINFt] 
 
 ^
1 1, H  
^
2 1, H  
^
1 3, H  
^
1 3, H  
^
1 4, H  
^
1 4, H  
LREVt 
 
1 0 0 1 1 0 
LOREVt 1.262 
[44.644] 
1 -1 
 
0 -0.743 
[-31.082] 
1 
LGOVt -2.106 
[-28.276] 
-1.209 
[-20.065] 
1 -0.58 
[-16.541] 
0 -0.796 
[-14.961] 
LEAIt 0 0.411 
[5.218] 
0 -0.523 
[-5.308] 
0 -0.666 
[-5.231] 
LINFt 0 -0.022 
[-2.639] 
0 0.026 
[2.497] 
0 0.028 
[2.050] 
 ^
1 1, H  
^
2 1, H  
^
1 3, H  
^
2 3, H  
^
1 4, H  
^
2 4, H  
LREVt -0.843 
[-6.826] 
1.106 
[6.996] 
-0.038 
[-1.187] 
-0.836 
[-6.771] 
-0.815 
[-6.614] 
-0.576 
[-5.807] 
LOREVt 0.237 
[0.754] 
-0.712 
[-1.774] 
0.415 
[5.177] 
0.219 
[0.703] 
0.179 
[0.578] 
-0.275 
[-1.101] 
LGOVt 0.316 
[2.648] 
-0.310 
[-2.034] 
-0.075 
[-2.446] 
0.320 
[2.669] 
0.335 
[2.815] 
0.314 
[3.275] 
LEAIt 0.129 
[1.627] 
-0.154 
[-1.524] 
-0.015 
[-0.762] 
0.132 
[1.680] 
0.132 
[1.693] 
0.122 
[1.944] 
LINFt 0.131 
[0.918] 
-0.110 
[-0.601] 
-0.050 
[-1.374] 
0.140 
[0.983] 
0.167 
[1.180] 
0.156 
[1.366] 
   Notes: Log-Likelihood (H1)=1673.47, Log-Likelihood (H3)= 1672.61, Log-Likelihood (H4)= 1671.22; t-values in 
brackets.  
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   Table 8. Normalized B matrix (with H3)    
 
 
 
 
 
     
              
 
  Notes: The estimated B matrix is normalized at the largest coefficient at the each row defines how the orthogonalized 
permanent (Perm) and transitory (Trans) shocks are associated with the estimated VAR residuals through the 
equation ut =Bet.  
 
       
              Table 9. Impact after 17 periods (with H3)                                     
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
              
             
 
    Notes: The estimates of C~ are the long run value of the 17 impulse response functions. The first two columns 
describe the zero long run affect of the transitory shocks on the variables of the system, and the last three columns 
describe the long run effect of the permanent shocks, i.e. the structural second permanent shock ul2,t  is defined as 
~
2,
t
t
LEAI
el tu C
where 
~
t
LEAIC is the LEIAt row in the C~ matrix.  
             
 
 Figure 1: IRF for the permanent and transitory shocks with H3 (17-period effects) 
 
Notes: Fig. 1 illustrates the dynamic impulse response functions for each of the system variables as a result of a one 
standard deviation shock to the ui,t, i = 1, …p.  
 eLREVt eLOREVt eLGOVt eLEAIt eLINFt 
Trans(1) 1.000 -0.125 -0.454 -0.517 0.022 
Trans(2) -0.421 -0.568 1.000 0.459 0.394 
Perm(1) 0.422 0.228 1.000 -0.303 0.165 
Perm(2) 0.105 0.014 -0.087 1.000 -0.139 
Perm(3) 0.027 0.046 -0.458 0.142 1.000 
 Trans(1) Trans(2) Perm(1) Perm(2) Perm(3) 
LREVt 0.001 -0.003 4.195 2.207 0.544 
LOREVt -0.007 0.024 7.186 -0.003 -0.025 
LGOVt 0.001 -0.005 7.171 0.001 0.005 
LEAIt -0.000 0.000 0.369 4.107 -0.000 
LINFt 0.003 -0.012 6.003 -2.201 -20.905 
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   Table 10. Normalized B matrix (with H1).          
 
 
 
 
 
     
              
 
Notes: The estimated B matrix is normalized at the largest coefficient at the each row defines how the orthogonalized 
permanent (Perm) and transitory (Trans) shocks are associated with the estimated VAR residuals through the 
equation ut =Bet. 
 
       
             Table 11. Impact after 15 periods (with H1).                                          
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
              
             
 
 Notes: The estimates of C~ are the long run value of the 15 impulse response functions. The first two columns 
describe the zero long run affect of the transitory shocks on the variables of the system, and the last three columns 
describe the long run effect of the permanent shocks, i.e. the structural second permanent shock ul2,t  is defined as 
~
2,
t
t
LEAI
el tu C
where 
~
t
LEAIC is the LEIAt row in the C~ matrix.  
 
 
Figure 2: IRF for the permanent and transitory shocks with H1 (15-period effects). 
 
 
Notes: Fig. 2 illustrates the dynamic impulse response functions for each of the system variables as a result of a one 
standard deviation shock to the ui,t, i = 1, …p.  
 
 
 
 
 eLREVt eLOREVt eLGOVt eLEAIt eLINFt 
Trans(1) 1.000 -0.124 -0.424 -0.551 0.037 
Trans(2) -0.376 -0.488 1.000 0.212 0.378 
Perm(1) 0.442 0.275 1.000 -0.223 0.155 
Perm(2) 0.098 -0.007 -0.080 1.000 -0.143 
Perm(3) 0.021 0.041 -0.469 0.193 1.000 
 Trans(1) Trans(2) Perm(1) Perm(2) Perm(3) 
LREVt 0.001 -0.005 4.163 2.197 0.587 
LOREVt -0.009 0.032 8.518 -1.800 -0.508 
LGOVt 0.002 -0.009 7.049 0.001 0.008 
LEAIt -0.000 0.001 0.463 4.110 -0.001 
LINFt 0.006 -0.020 5.939 -2.496 -20.812 
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Table 12. Normalized B matrix (with H4).          
 
 
 
 
 
     
              
 
Notes: The estimated B matrix is normalized at the largest coefficient at the each row defines how the orthogonalized 
permanent (Perm) and transitory (Trans) shocks are associated with the estimated VAR residuals through the 
equation ut =Bet.  
 
       
                Table 13. Impact after 17 periods (with H4).                                          
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
              
             
 
Notes: The table 13 describes the estimates of C~ which are the long run value of the 17 impulse response functions. 
The first two columns describe the zero long run affect of the transitory shocks on the variables of the system, and the 
last three columns describe the long run effect of the permanent shocks, i.e. the structural second permanent shock 
ul2,t  is defined as 
~
2,
t
t
LEAI
el tu C
where 
~
t
LEAIC is the LEIAt row in ~C the matrix.  
 
 
Figure 3: IRF for the permanent and transitory shocks with H4 (17-period effects). 
 
 
Notes: Fig. 3 illustrates the dynamic impulse response functions for each of the system variables as a result of a one 
standard deviation shock to the ui,t, i = 1, …p.  
 eLREVt eLOREVt eLGOVt eLEAIt eLINFt 
Trans(1) 1.000 -0.129 -0.489 -0.447 -0.033 
Trans(2) -0.477 -0.634 1.000 0.802 0.281 
Perm(1) 0.423 0.180 1.000 -0.385 0.166 
Perm(2) 0.107 0.042 -0.092 1.000 -0.130 
Perm(3) 0.053 0.021 -0.411 0.076 1.000 
 Trans(1) Trans(2) Perm(1) Perm(2) Perm(3) 
LREVt 0.001 -0.003 4.294 2.039 0.424 
LOREVt -0.007 0.024 5.793 2.740 0.545 
LGOVt 0.001 -0.004 7.207 0.001 0.004 
LEAIt 0.000 -0.001 0.290 4.053 0.001 
LINFt 0.002 -0.006 5.440 -1.625 -20.496 
